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WERE I to exploit a cue that Alistair M. Taylor provides in his essay on evolution and revolution in 
society, I might begin by saying that my own remarks will be complementary to his. For, although those 
aspects of the human scene that I have chosen to emphasize remain peripheral to his expressed interests, 
our views are not, I think, incompatible, especially when interpreted as divergent estimates of systems 
boundaries. However, a discussion carried on between us at this level might well resemble a quarrel 
between movie cameramen . . . about when to catch the panorama and when to zoom in for a closeup. I do 
not question his claim that evolution and revolution may be considered complementary models of societal 
change.' Nor would I seriously question the appropriateness of drawing upon general systems theory to 
develop a level-theory of societal change.2 But were I to proceed along these lines I would merely 
contribute to the sort of inter-personal equilibrium that is painless for all concerned but clarifies nothing. 
This would be regrettable, since an a normative level . . . our disagreement proceeds from different views 
about the procedural ground-rules, the scope and perhaps even the very goals of societal analysis.
In a word, though we are both participants in and both observers of the human scene, Professor Taylor 
chooses to write primarily as a disinterested observer, I rather as a concerned participant. From this latter 
perspective, it seems to me that his attempt at objective analysis of societal change is inadequate-not 
because he tries to go beyond an evolution/revolution dichotomy in the name of quanta, systems and 
complementarity, but because, while seeking so meticulously to
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legitimate his views on society by an appeal to theoretical physics, he allows himself little time to tell us  
what possible bearing any of this might have upon the existential, or historical, problematic of deciding 
between or committing oneself and/or others to evolution or revolution.3 Instead, he almost seems to be 
saying that if we can just develop the right conceptual tools in time, we might yet be able to avert such  
obstacles to human progress as "world wars, gas chambers and genocide, etc." as well as "thermonuclear  
holocaust.”4 In particular,  had he chosen to deal more explicitly with the sociological and ecological  
implications of societal change, he might not have been able to discuss evolution and revolution without 
acknowledging the worldwide problem of social  dualism and marginalization :  the almost  systematic 
shunting aside of millions of people whose labor, and hence whose very existence, has been rendered  
industrially superfluous.5 These lacunae, in turn, point to some overarching methodological questions 
about scientific objectivity : what it really entails and whether and to what extent it is appropriate in 
dealing with problems that concern us all as human beings.
I fully appreciate the importance of objectivity as an ideal, but am persuaded that it . . . can . . . [n]ever 
. . . be any more than this, at least not when human beings are at stake. In particular, . . . questions such as 
that of evolution and revolution on the level of human society are to a significant degree a function of 
internal and external power politics and . . ., as a result, they cannot be totally abstracted from those great 
questions of personal and public responsibility that the events of the twentieth century have taught us to 
regard as so excruciatingly realistic. Accordingly, . . . when issues such as these are "on the floor," if one  
strives  too  strenuously  for  disinterested  objectivity  he  runs  the  risk  (an  occupational  hazard  among 
theoreticians)  of  giving  the  impression  that  what  is  is  indeed  what  ought  to  be,  thereby  at  times  
transmuting the innumerable horrors of man's inhumanity to man into a patient Martian's research report  
on what is left of earthlings. On the other hand, . . . to become embroiled in the particularities of human 
events, . . . succumb to making value judgments, [and] . . . take committed stands on controversial issues 
before, as they say, all the data are in, is to put oneself at the mercy of whatever gods preside over the  
fickleness of historical inevitability. Admittedly, when faced with what may be called a
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micro-problem, it is often better to be safe than sorry; but when it comes to the macro-problem of human 
survival, no one is safe and few may live to be sorry.6
What is  tacitly at  issue here is  whether anyone can really do anything significant  about  anything 
significant  that  happens.  The ancient  Stoics had one answer to this,  bonzes burning in the streets of  
Saigon have had another, and revolutionaries of all kinds have had yet others. To be sure, all of them are 
eventually swept into oblivion by the plodding thoroughness of geological time; yet because of them, in  
spite of them and regardless of them, changes have occurred in human affairs. Some of these changes  
have indeed been so significant that, even before the Industrial Revolution had really taken hold in the  
world, a German philosopher was willing to surmise that the best laid plans of mice and men may well  
gang awry but are co-opted by "the cunning of Reason" to get it all together anyway.7 Few today would 
allow that Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel had thereby really succeeded in putting history in a basket. 
But, then, for all the subsequent efforts of a Darwin, a Marx and a Freud, no one else has succeeded very  
well either-at least not on the level of ideas.8 On the level of action, on the other hand, there are signs 
that, in spite of the so-called "population bomb,"  homo sapiens  may yet experience the elimination of 
many and the control of the rest by a very few. These few, these technocratic few, constituting at least the 
beginnings of an international and supranational power elite,  will  continue to be in conflict with one  
another to decide who shall control the controllers.9 But, at least partly on the grounds that might makes 
right,  they will  be essentially in agreement with one another that they and they alone are capable of  
deciding what is good for all.10
Somewhat along these lines lie the differences -- in method if not in motive -- between my approach 
and . . . Taylor’s. To spell out these differences I will consider the question of societal change from three 
different,  but  interrelated,  points  of  view.  First,  from the viewpoint  of  social  theoretics,  I  recognize 
advantages to thinking about social change in terms of systems, levels, and complementary modes of 
transition, but also certain disadvantages that derive from the predominantly Western elitism that enables 
one to see "modernization" while remaining blind to "marginalization" (Part I : Thought and Reality).  
Secondly,  from the  viewpoint  of  societal  cybernetics,  I  acknowledge  the  technological  potential  for 
regulating social change (especially through applications of systems
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theory, cybernetics and real time science), but am wary of the inherent dangers of technocracy (Part II:  
Science and Society). Thirdly, from the viewpoint of inter-societal dialectics, I contend that when societal 
cybernetics is allowed to proceed without criticism, goal orientation and even periodical redirection, there 
inevitably results a system imbalance which in its turn engenders frustration, desperation and rebellion on  
the part of those left out as "unfit" (Part III: Evolution and Revolution). Whence, in my judgment, the 
exceptional urgency in our times of restoring to theoretics its once vital function as societal critique.11
I. THOUGHT AND REALITY
Lest this be misunderstood as representing some sort of anti-intellectualist manifesto, let it be noted at the 
outset that action, if it is to be truly human, must be goal-directed, and goal-directedness presupposes 
thought.12 Accordingly, every society that seeks to survive as a society into the future must face the task 
of developing appropriate and adequate ways of thinking about and dealing with social change. This task 
is not always described or carried out in the same way from one age to another, from one society to  
another, or  from one sub-society to another.  But  generally speaking,  it  calls for devising symbols or 
myths whereby the members of a society might learn to evaluate all social change against the primordial  
value of societal stability.13
It is quite widely assumed that one may characterize a given society as primitive or modern according 
to its  commonly held attitudes toward social  change.  The primitive society,  on this view, thrives on 
ideological justifications of the status quo, whereas the modern society is continually changing and hence 
is in need of justifying such change to itself.14 These extremes of a continuum of attitudes toward social  
change  might  be  thought  of  dichotomously  as  emphasizing  either  synchrony or  diachrony;  but  they 
cannot be handily equated with such modern political tags as those of conservative or progressive (or  
radical). For as the common myth has it, all moderns of whatever political stripe accept and favor social  
change, disagreements being rather over the means, the rate and the scope of such change. As is implicit  
in Alvin Toffler's recent study of what he calls "future shock," there may not be as many moderns around 
as one is sometimes led to believe; or, to put it somewhat differently, there may well
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be something of the primitive in all of us.15
This element of primitivism in modern thought about social change is manifest in a form of theoretical  
bias that derives from attributing fully human significance to sub-human systems and that, accordingly, 
results in totemism. Interpreting totemism as a primitive form of objectivism the modern exacerbation of  
which is scientism, I shall contend that scientistic totemism, like any other, is metaphysically void if taken 
dogmatically, methodologically suspect even if taken only hypothetically, and notoriously ambiguous and 
indecisive if  taken programmatically.  Especially is  this  the case when it  comes to  theories  of  social  
change; for no matter how stable a social system, so-called, may appear to be at any given moment in  
history, it is a very delicate balance when considered from the perspective of geological time. Classical 
(in essence, Aristotelian) analysis of society tended to emphasize the stability of a society, and hence in 
its more contemporary dress tends to find some sort of systems theory to be quite congenial.16 This static 
approach translates a substantialist  bias into the assertion that  there must  be  something constant  that 
changes when there is social change. Hence ex hypothesi society is essentially stable: what change does 
occur  is  usually  change  within  society,  rarely  change  from  one  society  to  another.  Some  recent 
approaches to social change, being more dynamic or, perhaps better, dialectical in their bias, discredit  
stability as an arbitrary and a-historical claim, take conflict as a constant dimension of human interaction, 
and hence see their chief problem not as one of accounting for "deviance" and "disruption" but rather of 
accounting for social stability as such. A position . . . intermediate between these theoretical or at least  
methodological extremes is stage-theory, which seeks in the notion of stages (or levels, as in Taylor's 
theory) a way to account for radical  transformations through time without  sacrificing formal or even 
organic continuity.17
Given these  major  differences  in  theoretical  posture,  there  is  perhaps  no  notion  in  contemporary 
thought  about  social  change  that  is  more theory-laden than that  of  society.  Often  viewed as  having 
developed out of and even as standing in opposition to more primitive, personal or organic sets of human 
relationships each of which is identified as a community  (Gemeinschaft  as opposed to  Gesellschaft),  a 
society (often considered to be co-extensive with a nation if not with a government or state) is thought of  
as a sophisticated, complex, impersonal, bureaucratic and industrially
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oriented set of positions or roles that persons happen to fill. Thus conceived, a society might be defined as 
a supra-communitarian, hierarchically differentiated set of positions or roles controlled by a government  
or state that corresponds at least approximately to the consensus demands of technological power.18 This  
particular way of defining society is not in itself biased in favor of "modernization," or technological  
development, but writers who would subscribe to it seem generally persuaded that such modernization, 
however brought about, is at least inevitable if not intrinsically progressive.19
What is here suggested is that a theory, in its broadest (and etymological) sense is a way of looking at  
a certain set of recurrent events, data, phenomena, or whatever. In this vein, "evolution" and "revolution," 
especially as applied to social change, refer only indirectly to social change as such and directly to a  
theory  about  or  interpretation of  events,  data,  phenomena that  give  content  to  the  concept  of  social  
change.  As  alternatives,  one  might,  for  example,  prefer  to  conceptualize  social  change  cyclically,  
dialectically,  millenaristically,  fatalistically,  or  in  any number  of  other  ways.  If,  however,  one  does 
choose to theorize about social change either in terms of "evolution" or in terms of "revolution," he is  
bound in by long-established usages that  ascribe social  continuity to the former,  discontinuity to the 
latter.20 Moreover, as a result of a long history of ideas about events and of events attributed to ideas, 
both  "evolution"  and  "revolution"  contain  built-in  evaluations  that  make  them  almost  irremediably 
normative and even prescriptive with regard to what is good or evil for human society in general or, as is 
more often the case, for some concrete human society in particular.
Now, to go one step farther, what leads some people to appeal to evolution as the mechanism of social  
change while others appeal to revolution? Moreover, so as not to overlook the normative dimension of  
this question, why do some favor and support "evolution" while others favor and support "revolution"?  
Surely one of the relevant factors here, and perhaps the most decisive of all, is that of power differential,  
i.e., the extent to which one does in fact control or at least share in control over the social system in  
question, and hence over one's destiny insofar as this latter is dependent upon that social system.
On the contrary, it might be objected, if the factor of power be given so central a role in one's theory of 
social change, the society that changes becomes little more than an ad hoc ("temporary" or
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"transitional") set of rules, roles and relations that obtain among a group of people who are forced by 
circumstances to live together and hence somehow to make the best of it.21 But who are thought to be 
"living together" depends in part upon how narrowly one associates "together" with physical as opposed 
to psychological boundaries, geographical as opposed to sociological contiguity. As . . . Taylor has so  
graphically suggested, people's physical contiguity extends beyond "impleted" space in virtue of means of  
communication (including transportation) to include "expleted" space.22  But human (as compared, say, to 
ant) society can also be analyzed in terms of psycho-social contiguity; and from this point of view the 
problem of societal boundaries (so important for a systems approach) becomes quite as difficult to solve 
in theory as it often is in practice. In either case, not infrequently, truth is but the offspring of power.
What all  this  means from the viewpoint  of  the powerless can for the moment be illustrated by a  
comparison between today's  Third World and the North American Indians of the nineteenth century. 
Much was demanded of an Indian tribesman who was forced by events to think beyond intra-tribal or  
even intertribal struggles for power in such wise as to take into account white expansionism and "manifest  
destiny." Even under comparatively stable circumstances, societal maintenance requires a delicate balance 
between centripetal and centrifugal forces: the latter increases with pressure from within; the former with  
pressure from without. But as that external pressure becomes so great as to render societal maintenance  
from within impossible, outsiders who were heretofore peripheral to the old society now become the 
center of the new.23
This, in greatly expanded fashion, is what is happening on a massive scale all over the world today.  
Numerous pockets of these "decentralized" rejects are found in the unenviable role of desperate rebels  
struggling often quite literally for bare survival. Their so-called and self-styled revolutionary responses to 
being first discarded and then directly oppressed are, to be sure, occasionally from strength, but usually  
(at least under present conditions) from weakness and frustration. Hence the many and varied attempts on 
the part of various leaders of the Third World to unite scattered forces of opposition in order somehow to 
hold their own if not to catch up with the Great Powers. Whatever may come of all  this in, say, the  
century ahead,  it  seems clear that  neither for the supranational  power elite nor for the devolutionary  
outcasts that it indirectly creates are present
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social systems considered sacred or even insurmountably stable. On this point, the history of the world 
just  since  1945  provides  enough  instances  of  major  social  transformations  to  warrant  some  like 
expectations for the future.
On the assumption, then, that the dynamic view of society is verifiable, though not to the exclusion of  
the static view, I should now like to draw some corollaries from my general thesis that a society is a 
delicate balance.
First, it is impossible to establish a pattern for societal change that would be so definitively declarative 
of what is necessarily the case ("valid," perhaps, in . . . Taylor's terminology) as to transcend entirely the 
bias of one's own position in some historical society.24 [For, whatever pattern one seeks to apply] . . . ,  
one is  inevitably,  inescapably and insurmountably drawing upon metaphor--however sophisticated its 
origin--quite literally to "make sense" out of the human drama in which each of us manages to have at  
least a walk-on part.
Secondly, when one does appeal to some such metaphor as revelatory of the pattern of social change,  
he may do so in any number of ways, most if not all of which can be co-present (whether manifest or  
latent) at the same time. Even assuming that the mode of making such appeal is verbal, i.e., linguistic in a  
narrow sense, this verbal appeal occurs in what might be called concentric circles of context. . . . There is 
no  one  method  that  could  handle  all  [imaginable]  .  .  .   concentric  circles  well,  but  anything  from 
psychoanalysis to systems analysis to language analysis can be relevant or applicable.
Thirdly, the critic or analyst of such an appeal, who could, of course, be identical with the appealer, 
might want to explicate the latter's hierarchy of values, his set of practical priorities, his views about how 
best to justify--or rationalize--what he believes or wills
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to believe, and, finally, his opinion as to how well he has succeeded or can succeed at developing such a  
justification. With regard to views about social changes, one's view may be described as absolutist if . . . it  
is  considered to  be beyond doubt  or  correction;  hypothetical,  relative  or  pragmatic  if  .  .  .  [deemed] 
tentative, heuristic, exploratory, or the like.25
     Fourthly, any such appeal, with or without justification and critique, is a social action, a performative, 
inasmuch  as  it  is  intended  to  have  an  influence  upon  the  present  and  future  behavior  of  others.26  
Thus, . . . Taylor . . . [wants] . . . us [to] conceptualize . . . social change complementarity after the fashion 
of general systems theory; and he goes an extra mile, so to speak, to provide us with suggestions about  
how we might in fact do this. But he does not tell us explicitly what concrete actions we might carry out 
on the basis of such complementarity-thinking. One might like to say that on this level we are dealing 
with a "middle-of-the-road" approach to social change; but the message is not clear-not because of coding 
or static, but because the metaphor utilized becomes highly ambiguous when searched for clues to action. 
The subatomic world can be handled in terms of equations that allow for either a wave or a particle  
interpretation of matter. However valuable all of this might be to the nuclear physicist, what does it have  
to do with societal change? Does it encourage evolution or revolution in society? If both, as Taylor would  
apparently have it, then what are the practical consequences of such a position? Should one push for 
evolution today, revolution tomorrow-or vice versa? Does it permit one to say, let others revolt, evolution 
is good enough for us; or, on the other hand, let others wait for evolution; as for us, we revolt? In fact, it  
says nothing about any of these burning questions. Rather it seems to be saying that the important thing 
about social change is to have an adequate theory in terms of which to conceptualize it without falling  
back on mere analogies.27 Further implied, it seems, is the not uncommon belief that for at least one 
segment of society-the theoretician-impartial and objective observation is the only appropriate kind of  
action to take with regard to social change. But this, in turn, is precisely to propose that one should do  
nothing,  at  least  not  if  one  has  a  similar  station  or  role  in  society.  Others,  however,  do  take  such 
observations and use them as they will.28 So if the "observer" is not opposed to such third-party
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utilization of his observations,  then he tacitly approves or at least  tolerates it-in which case he is not  
entirely as impartial as his image would lead one to suppose.  Fifthly, it is important to know for which 
society or  societies  one's  theory  of  change  is  a  model.  Some theories-especially  those that  appeal  to 
evolution and/or revolution (including . . . Taylor’s)--are presented as being universal, that is, as applying  
to all societies of all times and places. Others are limited both spatially and temporally, e.g., to Western 
Europe during the nineteenth century or to Peru in 1969, and still others pertain only to a limited segment 
(or class or caste) of a given society over a limited period of time.29 Sixthly, the very notion of a society 
becomes fraught with ambiguity once it is asserted that a society can and does change levels. . . . Taylor 
has graphically shown us that the "impleted" and the "expleted" spaces of today's societies are far greater  
than were those of primitive societies. But in what sense does this imply that something identifiable as 
"society" has changed? What is the constant through time? It is not clear from Taylor's analysis why the  
supposed continuity from one level of organization to another level should be thought of as anything more 
than a useful literary device to provide a vastly oversimplified "over-view" of extremely complex and  
generally  unpredictable  interactions  between  different  groups  of  people  over  space  and  time. 
Seventhly, . . . can [one] . . . talk meaningfully and even facilely about an isolated "society." This, in my 
opinion, is debatable. Taking the notion as referring to an organization of people geographically separated 
from other people who are organized among themselves, it is certainly not difficult to view one society as  
being distinctly different from and largely independent of another society. But once these societies enter  
representationally into contact with one another, the assumption that there are two societies rather than one  
begins  to  be  something  of  an  abstraction.  And  once  their  interrelationship  becomes  formalized  and 
stabilized,  the "twoness" borders on pure fiction.30 This,  however, is just  what does happen as better  
means of communication, transportation and domination are developed. As  eighth and final point,  one 
risks a rather immense distortion of the real state of affairs in the world today if he telescopes modern 
society into the narrow confines of today's technocrats and their toys.
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It  may indeed be the case,  for  example,  that  a  sub-group of Americans has  become supportive of or  
actively engaged in space exploration. But there is another, and much larger, sub-group of Americans who 
suffer  from chronic malnutrition;  and it  is  not  easy to prove that  the former sub-group does not  owe  
something of its success to the ability of these others to endure deprivation. Moreover, there are large sub-
groups of people in what we still call "other countries" who are starving while the particular technocratic 
masters  who  happen  to  control  their  fate  capitalize  on  the  natural  resources  (including  cheap  labor)  
available in their land.31
It is perhaps edifying to know that a power elite from various countries-shall we think of them as the  
"fittest" or simply as the "beautiful people"?-are moving on, perhaps "taking off," towards L.32  But many 
human beings in the world today not only are not advancing to a higher level but are in fact retrogressing  
to a lower one. . . . They may be found by the thousands, sometimes by the tens of thousands, clinging 
helplessly and hopelessly to one another, sometimes on the outskirts, sometimes in the decaying center of  
that megalopolis that appears so prominently on . . . Taylor's itinerary to the world ahead.33 Not unlike the  
slaves who died while building the Pharaoh's pyramids, these lost millions are like the fecal matter left  
along the road on which the great evolving beast is passing on its way to "progress." Disorganized and 
disinherited from the wealth of their own lands, they are quite at the mercy of an imperialist power elite, be 
it, say, the Communist Party in Czechoslovakia, or American oilmen in Saudi Arabia or Venezuela.
Such exploitative arrangements, resulting in multinational and supranational centralization of control,  
have come to be a predominant characteristic of this century. It would seem, therefore, that an adequate  
assessment of societal change would at least make mention of it.
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II. SCIENCE AND SOCIETY
Be not misled by the note of gloom, if not of doom, that hangs over these remarks about societal control in 
the world today.  Societal  control  is  not  necessarily  in and of  itself  oppressive.  That  it  has taken and 
continues to take this form is due, among other things, to the fact that only in recent times have science and 
technology begun developing the technical means to handle global (not to mention galactic) problems on a  
truly  global  scale.  Thus,  with  the  help  of  ever  more  subtle  and  sophisticated  tools,  once  seemingly  
impossible projects are now being seriously planned and one day will undoubtedly be carried out:  for  
example, to irrigate the desert regions of the earth with water from polar ice; to eliminate many if not all  
physical  and mental  disorders through genetic and chemical  control;  to provide precise,  thorough and 
instant information on any subject to anyone who needs it anywhere in the world through television, video 
and microwave, lasers and ever more "ingenious" computers.34
With  particular  regard  to  computers,  it  now  seems  that  we  are  even  moving  beyond  the  age  of  
cybernetics (preprogrammed control or guidance systems) to an age of real-time control. Born out of the 
challenge to detect and destroy the multiple warheads of approaching ICBM's, real time science has grown 
up solving "on the scene" a great variety of problems that develop without warning under the ocean, out in 
space, or wherever. The new systems-both hardware and software-that are being utilized for continual ad'  
hoc problem-solving may be viewed as the technological implementation of a pragmatist philosophy of 
action as well as the basis for a post-positivist philosophy of science. Science, on this view, can no longer  
be totally identified with the pre-established harmonies that are built into theoretical systems, since it also 
includes the highly complex, and now computer-assisted, search for answers at the very moment when the 
question arises.35
This problem-oriented conceptualization of science does not lend itself well to definitive formulations 
of what science says and still less of what science itself is all about. A discussion of the old distinctions  
between pure and applied science or between science and technology would be relevant, to be sure, but  
inconclusive. For what is at issue goes quite beyond the reach not only of verbal gymnastics but also
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of all classical philosophy of science.36 This is due to (1) a new appreciation of the primacy of practice or,  
better, the continuity between theory and practice and (2) a new appreciation of the independence of the 
social sciences both from physicalist and from formalist pontificating.
With  regard,  first,  to  a  theory/practice  continuum,  it  is  especially  important  to  note  that  the  new 
technology extends not merely man's arms, legs and senses but his brain, not just his capacity to do work 
but his capacity to think. There is, accordingly, ample reason to draw new models of thinking from the  
realm of the computer, as many have already done.37 Secondly, the declaration of independence on the part 
of the social sciences is perhaps not yet strong enough to be called a movement but it is advanced enough  
to be taken quite seriously. The sometimes unduly anti-scientific stance of the existentialists has been 
drawn into a wider perspective of humanistic psychology.38 The sociology of knowledge has provided us 
with at least the beginnings of a sociology of sciences loosely associated with studies of the relationship  
between science and society.39 The ecological approach to environmental control has led a significant 
minority of scientists and engineers to move beyond narrow technical proficiency to a socially conscious 
awareness of their skills and of how they use them.40
In short, in these days of growing concern over such problems as environmental pollution, population 
explosion and thermonuclear annihilation, it is no longer considered quite so bizarre to maintain, as did 
one writer a few years back, that science is a sacred cow.41 Nor is the progress of science any longer taken  
to be an obvious and unqualified blessing. From the vantage point of the social implications of science and 
of the corresponding social responsibility of scientists, all science, and perhaps especially physical science, 
has begun to be more widely recognized as a thoroughly human cooperative enterprise that introduces into  
the world changes that are often as threatening as they are profound and fundamental.42 Adherents of the  
rigorous but narrow philosophy that science is just a consistent set of law-like statements contend mightily 
that man's role in science is, if more than incidental, then largely obstructive .43 But men with a broader 
and inestimably more realistic outlook are now insisting that to be at all fruitful our analysis of science 
must see it as a system of interlocking components all aimed at preselected research goals, hence must  
relinquish uni-dimensional models in
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favor of a meticulous reconstruction of all the components that enter into that system as well as the links 
between them. This reconstruction, in turn, would show that the most important component of all is the  
prosthesis/cyborg: man-interfaced-with-machine.44
As a result of this modern transformation of science into a largely institutional enterprise, the individual 
who "goes into science" generally finds that he is little more than a functionary in a complex system of 
roles that are closely tied to the great engines of industry. His own personality and need for responsibility 
having thus been reduced to largely irrelevant appendages, it is even more of a shock for "the working  
scientist"  to  be told that  his  role  in  society at  large is  no longer  looked upon as  either  obviously or  
necessarily valuable. Writers of science fiction, especially in the United States, continue to tell him what  
he wants and perhaps needs to believe about himself as scientist, namely, that he as an individual is or at  
least can be of crucial importance to the well-being of his people. But negative feedback from the world  
that Big Science has built is increasing so rapidly that many are now ready to presume the scientist guilty  
until proven innocent.45
In a context such as this, one might think it somewhat insensitive of . . . Taylor to have drawn up a  
theory of social change that dances to the tune of subatomic particles. But like most academicians today  
(here I must no doubt include myself), he has been conditioned to try to say something that will be of  
lasting and permanent value, what is called a "contribution" to a given discipline. And since, apparently, he 
does not find any bedrock of certitude in the social sciences,46 he turns to what the high priests of the Age  
of Science have revealed to us from out of their holy of holies. That their formulas have literally nothing to 
do with human beings as such is of little moment; what matters is that their formulas are sacred. Thus, just 
as institutional theologians of every faith are constrained to show that their own reasoned opinions can 
somehow be traced to the appropriate holy writings, so we find . . . Taylor legitimizing his views about 
social change by a quasi-magical appeal to the inner sanctum of the physics laboratory.47
Like all other primitives, many moderns tend, sometimes in spite of themselves, to return to Mother 
Earth for foundations. Having thus involved themselves in a highly sophisticated form of totemism, they 
rely  on  this  "concrete  science"  (as  Claude  Lévi-Strauss  might  interpret  it)  to  structuralize  the  "too-
confusing-for-words" details of
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everyday life in human society. But, as Lévi-Strauss has argued, this kind of thinking is not primitive in  
the sense of original but is in fact decadent. For instead of facing directly the socio-cultural conflicts out of  
which the delicate balance of a given societal "arrangement" has come into being, one instead traces that  
arrangement to sub-human-usually animal or vegetable-beings and then in time comes to think of the latter 
as  somehow  causally  responsible  for  such  arrangements.48  In  this  way,  one  comes  to  regard  a 
circumstantial structure as an inevitable consequence of natural laws; and, like the citizens of Bouville in 
J.-P. Sartre's Nausea, can hardly imagine that one might be directly, even if only partially, responsible for 
the maintenance of that system.49
To be sure,  the totems of our day are no longer as simple as trees, or  streams, or animals.  Man's  
interests and needs have led him in the past few hundred years to concentrate his attention on the innards  
of inanimate objects. Much has been learned and much has thereupon been applied both for weal and for  
woe. With regard especially to the latter, we have found ourselves becoming more and more ingenious in  
our ability to destroy one another, with men doing the dirty work and women doing the cheering. As we  
move  from catastrophe  to  catastrophe,  we  continue  to  bemoan  the  low yield  of  the  so-called  social 
sciences, make a plea for them to catch up with the natural sciences, and then burn another candle at the 
shrine of our favorite up-to-date totem, be it atom-smasher, television, computer, laser beam or whatever, 
thereby inducing in ourselves  a  false consciousness  more elaborate than anything ever  created out  of 
primitive lore. And thus do we make ourselves oblivious of inhuman forces that are directly responsible  
either for establishing or for maintaining the delicate balance that we call a society.50
In short, on the level of theoretics, appeals to theories from physics are of limited value in dealing with  
the complexities of any human society. But on the level of societal cybernetics, unceasing development of 
man's experimental and technological capabilities constitutes an indispensable condition for human well-
being on this planet.  Setbacks along this line have been numerous; and disasters,  including even total 
annihilation of all living species, are always possible as a result of misdirection or exploitation of this very 
technology. But setbacks and disasters just as staggering would inevitably result from somehow preventing 
any and every scientific discovery from having any effect upon society.
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In effect, then, the very dangers we fear complement the benefits we anticipate to provide a kind of  
projection of the present-day parameters of global freedom.51 For by virtue of knowledge attained and 
utilized, men steadily become ever more capable of controlling their own environment and one another as 
well;  and  in  our  own  day  it  even  becomes  meaningful  to  envision  an  electronic  elite  controlling  a  
worldwide society of the whole human race. Such a notion, perhaps, smacks of science fiction; but it is far  
closer to becoming a feasible option than the uninformed might dare to imagine. In this context evolution 
is now not only a process to observe and conceptualize but also, and in a far more immanent sense, a  
product of human ingenuity. In the language of Julian Huxley, evolution has become conscious of itself in 
and through men who know; even more than that, such men have become the principal engine of evolution 
on this planet. With the help of those marvelous machines -everything from the wheel to the electronic  
computer-that extend their organic information systems literally in all  directions, they  are planetizing  
Bacon's claim that knowledge is power, thereby  bringing into being what Teilhard de Chardin called a  
"mega-synthesis" and what Marshall McLuhan thinks of as an electronic "global village."52
From this point of view, it becomes clear that, in spite of the lack of political power of the average  
"working  scientist,"  the  leading  intellectuals,  especially  scientists  and  technologists,  can  have  a  great 
impact upon a society. Precisely to the extent that they assume their research findings to be disinterested, 
they are subject to being "co-opted" for anything but disinterested purposes, most of which have to do with  
bringing still  more wealth and power to those who already have more of both than most.53 But just  
because it is to the intellectuals that power-brokers turn and they whom they reward so handsomely for  
their efforts, there is established in society a symbiotic relationship that saves the truth of Bacon's power-
theory  of  knowledge:  knowledge  in  and of  itself  is  societally  powerless;  but  between two  otherwise 
balanced societal forces, superior knowledge will tip the balance in favor of its possessor.54
Until as recently as World War II, the knowledge that was most in demand tended, in general, to be  
knowledge that makes possible increased control over making things, so as to make them more efficiently,  
precisely, rapidly, economically, etc. Since World War II, however, the knowledge that is most in demand 
is nothing less than knowledge that makes possible increased control over the very process
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of knowing-gathering, interpreting and controlling the dissemination of knowledge, now understood as 
information-so as to know more efficiently, precisely, rapidly, economically, etc.55
Ideally speaking, control of media here means so regulating their use that one learns through them  
whatever one wants to know and keeps others from learning through them whatever one does not want  
them  to  know.  The  importance  of  thus  controlling  the  media  of  communication  has  no  doubt  been 
recognized by power elites at least since the invention of language.56 Thus, the same Plato who bemoaned 
the ignorance of those in the cave was also careful to indicate the need for strong censorship in that "ideal" 
society that could be governed only by a philosopher-king  (Republic).  On a broader scale, by means of 
everything from taboos to  weapons of  war,  in-groups of  whatever  size  and functions  have sought  to  
safeguard the secrecy of their arcane lore; and, inversely, by means of everything from fast runners to  
orbiting satellites they have sought to penetrate the secrecy of the out-group(s).57 It has even been argued,  
and rendered at least plausible, that control over printing after the fifteenth century was a  sine qua non 
condition for the establishment and maintenance of the modern nation-states of western Europe.58 Be that  
as  it  may,  few  doubt  that  control  of  the  press  has  long  represented  an  important  factor  in  societal 
maintenance. But all the rules of this game have been changing now that print communication is being 
superseded by such electronic media as radio, television, communication satellites, micro-waves, and the  
computer.
The so-called "underground" press still allows an alienated Left some means of expressing and to some 
extent of constituting a group identity; and the "overground" press, in general, helps the establishmentarian 
elements of society to maintain their posture as guardians of the public weal. But even politicians have  
come to realize that he who controls visual images on television can jolly well forget about symbolic 
images on the  printed  page.59  Similarly,  the  industry  that  built  a  sizable  empire  out  of  the  auditory 
inventions of Alexander Graham Bell now finds itself threatened by obsolescence unless it can muster up 
enough forces to prove its right to control over micro-wave communications--a right in itself as defensible 
as the right of carriage-makers to have controlled the automotive industry that threatened to end much of  
their  usefulness.60  But  nowhere  is  the  struggle  for  control  more  intense  than  in  the  area  of  that 
revolutionary extension of the brain itself, the computer. For by means of ever
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more sophisticated computers, men can not only process data with incredible ease and rapidity; they can 
also organize data into information and establish realtime control over as many systems or processes as 
imagination, ingenuity and the state of the art can simulate with model and machine. Whence the awesome 
impact of computer sciences, cybernetics and realtime science upon the whole process of transmitting  
information and, consequently, upon alignments of power insofar as these depend upon rapid access to 
reliable and appropriate information.61
As the restricted but highly significant example of the ongoing struggle for control of media suggests, it  
is well recognized by the power elites of today that now more than ever before societal control for the  
future depends upon control of technology. How the latter will work itself out in the years ahead can be  
only inadequately anticipated, as even futurists admit. But to the extent that the seeds of the future are  
indeed contained in the present, there is reason for believing that the human race is heading towards vast  
and unprecedented social upheaval. Why this seems likely remains to be discussed; but the discussion may 
be anticipated by two interconnected sets of observations about science and society.
In the first place, narrowly technical knowledge and skills do not of themselves qualify anyone to give 
advice on the social uses of science; yet on such matters almost no other qualifications have been sought  
by governmental decision-makers.62 Some members of the technical community doubt that their advice 
carries any political weight, especially when they appeal to values or ask for priorities other than efficiency 
or profit.63 Others feel that the impact of technology upon developed societies is already so great as to  
make traditional political structures and parties obsolete.64 In either case, technicians are consulted about 
technology  consistently  enough  to  lead  some  writers  to  identify  the  resulting  modus  operandi  as  a 
technocracy.65 However, due in large measure to a belated but growing realization that our technology 
may be leading us into social and ecological disaster, it may become somewhat more acceptable in high  
places to look to the social sciences and perhaps even the humanities for recommendations about life in a 
post-industrial if not leisure-oriented society.66 This new willingness to search beyond the machine-men 
for clues to societal guidance is further precipitated by a somewhat startled realization that the old values 
that have held our society together are being discarded and that the hard sciences
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have little to offer by way of a replacement.67
However traumatic all this may seem from inside a technological society such as ours, finally, it is in  
many respects a phenomenon arising within and limited to a highly technologized society. For, as Herman 
Kahn has noted almost casually:
It seems quite likely that outside of the 20% of the world that is expected to live in postindustrial  
societies by the year 2000,  the other 80% of humanity is  likely to be deeply preoccupied with 
various kinds of reactions that resulted from the process of more or less forced Westernization and  
then withdrawal.68
Poor grammatical tensing and matter-of-factness aside, this statement cannot be adequately handled within  
the limited confines of societal cybernetics, but calls for the broader context of intersocietal dialectics. And 
it  is  on this  level  that  there  appears,  in  its  most  dramatic  form,  the  realtime drama of  evolution and 
revolution.
III. EVOLUTION AND REVOLUTION
On the level of societal cybernetics, men have begun to assume control over the evolutionary process,  
especially by means of technology. But it is not all men who exercise such control. Indeed, an increasingly 
large segment of the human race has little or nothing to say about or even to do with this advanced edge of  
the evolutionary process. Quite the contrary, for every advance that gives some human beings still greater  
societal  control,  other  human beings  are  disengaged,  alienated,  exploited  and sometimes just  brutally 
eliminated.  Should  they  prove  unwilling  to  play  the  externally  imposed  role  of  dregs  along  the  
evolutionary way, they thereby would actualize a polarity latent in any social system that is not responsive 
to the needs and claims of all affected human beings.
This being said, we are at once faced with an immense problem that has already been anticipated just  
by referring to a society as a delicate balance. As Hobbes, Machiavelli and other analysts of societal power 
relationships saw, a society tends to be what some are powerful enough to make others accept,  and it  
remains that only so long as and to the extent that such acceptance, for whatever
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reasons, perdures. From this point of view, a given society might need to be viewed first, say, as a vector  
sum, then perhaps as a component of a vector. As internal forces shift, as new force is introduced either  
from within or from without, so does a given society change." Something of this sort occurs where there is 
a transfer of the so-called seat of power from one political party to another, as a result of an election, a  
coup, or whatever. But a far more profound vectorial transformation results from the "taking over" of a 
given society by outsiders. For, in such a case, whatever may have been the internal organization of the 
newly subordinated society, the set of all roles and relationships within that society tends to become a 
function of the set of those of the now dominant society. A tribe that has been colonized is no longer the  
tribe that existed before colonization; neither is a business. taken over by a corporation nor is a corporation 
merged into a conglomerate the same; nor, finally, is a conquered nation the same as it was prior to having  
been  conquered.  Titles  and  perquisites  may  remain  unchanged;  but,  in  terms  of  available  power; 
yesterday's rulers become today's errand boys."
More generally, all those disenfranchised by the power-brokers of societal control and unable to accept 
"natural selection" as a sufficient explanation for their degradation have no alternative but to leave the 
territory now under the control of others or to regain control of that territory themselves." Thus might 
those deemed or treated as "unfit" and hence "inferior" disturb or even prevent the expected survival of the 
purportedly  -fittest; and, to the degree that they are successful, the so-called unfit might well reactivate  
societal values that lay dormant so long as they merely endured oppression." From the viewpoint of inter-
societal dialectics,  then,  evolution takes the form of a gradualism that appeals to those with a vested  
interest in the  status quo,  whereas revolution takes the form of an action-oriented program of liberation 
deemed necessary precisely because of the power-brokers'  quasi-theological insistence upon their  own 
historical inevitability.
It is, of course, customary to use the word "reactionary" to describe the attitudes and actions of those  
who defend an established social system against attempts to change that system in any of its essentials  
(however  defined).  This  usage,  though  understandable  enough,  owes  its  meaning  to  a  very  narrow 
conception of the dynamics of a society through time. Within this limited and ahistorical context, those in
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control of a society may indeed do little more than "react" to an attempt by others (be they described as  
"revolutionary" or whatever) to alter or even overthrow that society. But if such dialectical confrontation is 
viewed within a wider historical context, one comes to see, I think, that it is often the revolt or rebellion  
against the established system that is "reactionary."
Taken superficially, it is a truism that one who rebels does so in reaction against powerful agents whose 
influence upon him he interprets as oppressive. More profoundly, rebellion is reaction in the sense that it  
proceeds from weakness rather than from strength, from frustration and even despair rather than from 
hubris and love of innovation." When viewed synchronically or ahistorically, such reaction to oppression 
tends to be interpreted acontextually as an unwarranted and unprovoked attack upon a system that others 
have found to be advantageous in  their  own regard.  But  when viewed diachronically,  in  the  light  of 
historical  context  and origins,  such an uprising can appear to have been not  only inevitable but  even 
remarkably belated in view of grievances previously endured without openly belligerent protest.
To restate the matter somewhat differently, once a given set of human relationships is taken for granted,  
any attempt to deviate from these relationships or, more traumatically still, to change them, tends to be  
viewed as "radical"-not in the etymological sense of "getting to the roots of the matter" (radix=root in  
Latin) but in the polemical sense of extreme and irresponsible. If, on the other hand, this set of human 
relationships is not taken for granted but is seen to be (as, in fact, it is) a contingent product of historical  
events,  then any corresponding attitude or action will  be radical precisely in the sense that at least in  
intention it uproots the system from comparatively shortsighted claims to historical inevitability.
In political terms, such radicalism has often been identified with the Left, and there are good reasons  
for so doing. But here one must be on guard against that facile labeling that would explain everything but 
understands  nothing.  People  in  the  so-called  free  world  have  been  taught  to  associate  the  Left  with 
Communism. But among so-called Communist nations there is a growing spirit of reaction against any 
institutional  rigidity,  however  ideologically  orthodox,  that  is  inappropriate  to  new  conditions.  In  this 
setting,  it  is  precisely  the  Establishment  that  identifies  itself  with  a  revolution  --  not  a  present  and 
continuing revolution, to be sure, but a once-upon-a-time
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revolution that is for all practical purposes over and done. Many states, of course, still trace their origins to 
some revolution  of  the  past  two hundred  years,  especially  France  and the  United  States.  States  thus 
established as recently as the twentieth century are likely to be closely identified with and even to derive 
their mythology from a revolution. This is obviously the case, for example, in Russia and even more so in 
Cuba. In both instances, however, the younger generation, which has not itself lived through the revolution 
eulogized in its elders'  mythology, tends to reject that revolution as but another excuse for unbending 
authoritarianism."
The  point  here,  quite  simply,  is  that  revolution  as  an  ideology  and  revolution  as  a  deliberately 
engineered  process  of  radical  change  must  be  carefully  distinguished.  Protagonist  control  may  be 
legitimated in any terms, and those terms associated with revolution are no exception. This is not to say, of  
course,  that  the  notion of  revolution  has  no  utopian  function among the oppressed antagonists  of  an 
established societal order. They both can be and at times are the agents of revolutionary societal change, 
just  to the extent  that  they are successful  in their  efforts  to achieve power for some group or groups 
heretofore at least partially excluded.
The function of societal antagonists differs according to the type of social system against which they 
are reacting. The most obvious form of opposition to oppression is that which arises among one group (a  
clan, a tribe, a race, a caste, a nation) that has been forcibly subdued and brought under control by an alien  
group which superimposes itself from without Whether the interface of superimposition is an occupation 
army, a puppet government, a colonial administration or a more subtle control of the internal economy 
through international monetary controls and various trade restrictions, the effect is essentially the same: a  
group of people who once determined their own destiny within a narrower world-context now find therr~ 
selves to have become exploited has-beens in a world that outreaches their learned ability to cope.
If a revolution is a radical change in form of government, then for a society once relatively independent  
suddenly to become subservient to more powerful others from outside is most assuredly a revolution. Nor  
can those subdued be expected to react favorably to such a major deterioration in their status. They may 
(1) despise themselves and strive to make themselves as inconspicuous as possible; (2) adulate and seek to  
imitate and be accepted by those who control
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their lives; or (3) despair of ever being fully accepted into the ranks of the controllers and in their despair  
turn to active antagonism against their societal protagonists."
This reaction pattern on the part of the oppressed is perhaps most clearly exemplified in the response of 
underdeveloped or even primitive indigenous peoples to their being continually exploited at the hands of  
more powerful people who have come to conquer and control. Less easily seen in this light, because more  
assiduously glamorized and romanticized in the West, is colonization against which many peoples have in  
recent years rebelled. Still less obvious is the fact that some subgroup(s) of people within one and the same 
group might truly be oppressed and impoverished, at least in comparison to others in that same group. This  
is perhaps less true of primitive tribes than of modern nation-states." But in either instance the reactions of  
the oppressed can range from at least overt acquiescence to militant rebellion, the latter extreme being 
more likely to occur (though less likely to succeed) in a modern nation-state. Between the extremes one  
notes such "movements" as the student movement, the black movement, the women's liberation movement.
In all these instances what is important to note is that rebellion constitutes an antagonist's reaction to a 
consistent pattern of actions on the part of a protagonist who, in turn, responds to the reaction by counter-
reaction. It is accordingly inaccurate and mystifying, as the Marxists would say, to claim that a protagonist  
group "does nothing" until the antagonist group rises up against it. The rebellion would not-probably could  
not-have occurred without a considerable amount of "doing" that has already proven detrimental (if not  
virtually genocidal) with regard to the antagonists. Whether such actions on the part of the antagonists are 
detrimental to themselves or to the human race as a whole is, of course, another though by no means 
unrelated question. But however that question is answered, there is good reason for saying, on the level of  
inter-societal dialectics, (1) that the evolution of protagonists may be a direct cause of the devolution and  
even extinction of others and (2) that a revolution by antagonists may be a direct cause of devolution on 
the part of erstwhile protagonists. This societal version of Newton's third law has been operative as far 
back in time as our information can take us, and differs today only in the magnitude of its scope and  
possible consequences.
With regard to the scope of inter-societal dialectics today, it is
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becoming more and more realistic to talk in terms of global confrontations. The so-called world wars that  
blighted the first half of this century were truly worldwide in the sense that they affected every continent to  
one degree or another. Since 1945, some formerly hostile power elites have been learning to compete and 
even cooperate  with  one  another  as  privileged peers  across  international  boundaries,  usually  to  their 
mutual  advantage  but  not  necessarily  to  the  advantage  of  the  masses  of  people  in  the  countries  thus 
represented."  There  does  not  seem to  be  any  one  pattern  that  may  be  said  to  characterize  all  these 
contemporary inter-societal situations except that they are precisely that, inasmuch as they spill over the  
boundaries of a host country or countries and involve one or more supranational interests that are powerful 
enough to control others for profit."
What shall  we say,  secondly,  about  the possible consequences of inter-societal  dialectics today? It  
seems in general  that  the thrust  of  evolution is,  as ever,  a two-edged sword that  cuts a clear path to  
"progress" for the few who are powerful enough to wield it, while dismembering the others who happen to 
be -- or,  what  is perhaps more regressive yet,  choose to place themselves -- in their way. It  is  of no 
particular  benefit  to  species  now in  danger  of  extinction  .  .  .  that  simians  begat  anthropoids  or  that  
anthropoids begat homo sapiens or that homo sapiens begat the industrialist or the industrialist is now 
begetting the technocrat  or  that  the  technocrat  may one day beget  instruments  of  worldwide or  even 
galactic control. Nor is such convergent evolution (quite different, to be sure, from that envisioned by  
Teilhard de Chardin!) of much benefit to those innumerable branches of the human species-almost all non-
whites and a growing number of superfluous whites-that have simply been in the way. For the protagonists  
of evolution have been no more mindful of bison hunters than of bison, no more mindful of fishermen than  
they were of the streams and lakes and oceans upon which those fishermen have depended. In other words, 
what is often thought of as pollution of the earth is inevitably a pollution of man as well." Problems once 
confined to ghettos finally attract the attention of "the public" once they have spilled over into the suburbs. 
So also on a global scale, the narrowly conceived and stupidly executed technologization of this planet has  
now come to endanger not only all subhuman flora and
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fauna and all  less developed or at least unscrupulous humans but even the protagonists whose will  to  
power has in recent centuries functioned as a real but ambivalent agent of evolutionary advancement. In  
the span of a single generation it has come to be almost humanly impossible to live and work in New York  
City. In a finite number of generations-and for some experts the number is quickly counted-the same may  
well be said of every once habitable metropolis on this planet."
The  obverse  side  of  this  coin  is  that  in  sharpening  the  action  edge  of  the  sword  of  evolution, 
protagonists have in spite of themselves sharpened the reaction edge as well. The colonialism that was so 
much  a  part  of  the  industrialization  of  Western  Europe  came  crashing  down after  Europe's  colonial 
empires reached their paroxysm of futility in two world wars. Now the neo-colonialism of the superstates,  
flying  the  banner  of  "modernization,"  is  moving  steadily  towards  heretofore  undreamed-of  levels  of 
control. But that very control is breeding dissent and opposition and open rebellion of many kinds and in  
many parts of the world."' The basic question of proprietorship and its legitimation is written small when  
students anywhere in the world ask aloud to whom the university belongs. On a global scale, men in all  
parts of the world are being compelled by the multiplying hints of impending doom to ask: to whom does  
the world belong? It is a mark of our heritage that this question is framed in a context of ownership; but the 
very  asking  of  the  question  can  perhaps  lead  men  out  beyond  proprietary  abuse  towards  a  shared 
responsibility  for  recuperation,  maintenance  and  ecologically  balanced  development  of  the  limited 
resources available to us on this planet. And chief of all these resources, as even economists are being  
challenged to take seriously, are human beings."
As Erich Fromm recently put it, a "revolution of hope" is possible only in and through a humanization 
of technology." But neither past nor present policies with regard to "modernization" lend much support to  
the  notion  that  a  humanization  of  technology  might  come  about  by  way  of  some  sort  of  historical  
inevitability. If it is to come at all, it will somehow be the result of a deliberate and concerted effort on the 
part  of  all  who  have  recognized  other  alternatives  as  intolerable  and  have  somehow  translated  this  
recognition into political-or, perhaps better, supra-political-power. It is indeed conceivable that present-day 
socio-political relations can be transformed
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into  what  Amitai  Etzioni  calls  "the  active  society."  But,  as  this  socio-political  analyst  intimates,  the 
structure within which each power group must  operate is  rapidly becoming international  and to some 
extent already global in scope. Accordingly, so long as the efforts of social outcasts in South Africa to 
control their own destiny are not effectively combined with those of others in the same region or continent,  
if not beyond, the supranational power elite who contend primarily only among themselves for control of 
knowledge,  communications  and technology will  continue  to  confuse  the  weakness  of  the  politically  
disorganized as a mandate to continue ruling as in the past."
It would seem, then, that the very survival-to say nothing of the prosperity-of the great majority of  
human beings on this planet is to a great extent a function of utility as defined by the powerful few." But as  
machines continue to substitute for and supersede not only the physical but even the intellectual labor of 
human beings, the latter will, in terms of work, be of no further use save to provide "services" for one  
another." At this point, their continued existence may be tolerated only so long as they are willing to stay  
out of the way and not try to gain what some call "a piece of the action." "Short-run" unemployment is still 
so  identified  in  developed  societies  with  "long-run"  economic  growth  that  its  presumably  temporary 
victims are afforded at least minimal compensation. But extended unemployment of the kind that is often 
the lot of people in the "developing" societies leads inevitably to widespread hunger and despair, and the  
latter tend to find expression in rebellion. But a despair born of hunger (spiritual as well as physical) and 
reared on oppression may seek its maturity in violence."
The long-range consequences of this increasingly dangerous world situation might well be a century 
not of genocide as such but of paupercide: the indirect elimination of the non-productive and the direct  
elimination of the counter-productive in many if not all parts of the world. If this be a kind of paranoia,  
then let it be said in defense of paranoia that it is supported by a large body of substantive data whose  
implications  become  clearer  with  each  passing  decade.  In  spite  of  such  ultimately  insignificant  
interferences as those brought about by kidnapping, airplane hijacking, rooftop sniping or the bombing of 
buildings, the opposition of outsiders against insiders seems inherently futile; and, if pursued in any given 
area to the point of major confrontation, could well lead to reprisals so effective
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and encompassing as to put the ovens of Auschwitz back into the Middle Ages of Population Control."  
For, while one-half of the world's population is centered in East, South and Southeast Asia and another  
one-fifteenth  each  inhabit  Latin  America  and  Africa,  control  over  and  development  of  the  world's  
resources is centered predominantly in North America, Europe and the USSR." Moreover, the power-gap 
here suggested is widening steadily rather than narrowing."
As is well known, living conditions in the United States and in India were closer together 150 years ago 
than they are now, partly because the latter country's economic growth has been absorbed by its increasing 
population. What is yet more sobering, however, is that India is not likely to "catch up." Given its present 
per capita annual income ($50 as compared with $2,000 in the U.S.A. in 1960), if both were to double over  
a decade or so, India's per capita income would then be $100, that of the United States, $4,000. In the  
meantime, the United States produces enough food to provide each of its inhabitants with 3,200 calories  
per day, twice that of India, which however has more than twice as many people and less than half as much 
land,  not  to  mention its  incomparably fewer  roads,  automobiles,  and  other  modern  conveniences.  To 
mention  just  a  few  key  indicators  of  technological  development,  in  the  United  States  per  capita 
consumption  of  energy in  1959 was  almost  8,000 kilograms of  coal  equivalent,  in  India  it  was  150 
kilograms; in the United States, 89 million long tons of steel were produced in 1960 (27 percent of the  
world total for that year), and 3'73 million metric tons of oil were produced in 1963 (29 percent of the  
world total for that year), whereas in India production of both of these sources of energy was then and still  
is negligible." As these sample figures indicate, the United States and India are almost literally worlds 
apart; yet it is unlikely that the former will prove very helpful in the latter's efforts towards economic  
development,  since its  economic policies respond primarily if  not  exclusively to internal  demands for  
protection against competitive imports. 12
Yet  another  aspect  of  the  growing  international  power-gap  is  the  tendency  of  highly  developed 
countries  to  exploit  the  mineral  resources  of  under-developed  nations  not  yet  in  a  position  to  take 
advantage of such resources themselves. A good example is that of oil. The currently prominent area of  
northern Africa called "the Middle East" would be a case in point, as would be the now
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somewhat quieter area of Indonesia." But it will be easier for our purposes to consider only the example of 
Venezuela.
About  13  percent  of  the  world  total  of  oil  is  produced  in  Venezuela:  149  metric  tons  in  1960, 
representing three-fourths of the total production of oil in all of Latin America." Venezuelan oil accounted  
for 23 percent of all exports from Latin America between 1953 and 1957 and close to 28 percent in 1957, 
as well as almost one-fourth of the annual average per capita rate of growth of the Latin American GNP 
during the years 1950-1957.95 As a result of this signal contribution to modern productivity, the per capita 
consumption of energy in Venezuela in 1959 was about 2,500 kilograms of coal equivalent-twice as much  
as Argentina, a little over half as much as the United Kingdom and about one-third that of the United 
States." Yet, however superficially impressive, these economic ratings are deceptive. For at least one-third 
of the GNP in Venezuela is due directly and far more indirectly to oil production, and this is entirely in the  
control  of  Dutch  and  American  companies  whose  official  welcome  depends  on  little  more  than  the 
payment of royalties to the local government. Out of a total population of over 7 million people, only 2 
percent (about 60,000) of the active labor force are directly employed by the oil industry, compared to at  
least 30 times that many in agriculture, which, however, accounts for only 7 percent of the GNP." Declared 
unemployment in 1960 stood at 13.7 percent, without even counting the many who were underemployed-
figures which represent demographically a growing class of superfluous outcasts referred to elsewhere (in 
Peru) as the marginal unemployed." In other words, behind the impressive facade of Caracas, poverty is 
rampant: one-fourth of the people receive two-thirds of the national income, and over 200,000 immigrants 
from the countryside wait in makeshift hovels called "ranchos" for their hopeless lives to ebb away. 99
In view, then, of all the foregoing, it is the case in Venezuela that-as the stock colonialist movie would  
have it "the natives are restless." And how this all came about makes yet another inglorious chapter in the  
story of technocracy's indifference to human misery for which it is at least in part responsible. Until 1960  
there was no organized guerrilla movement in Venezuela. Then in October of that year the Betancourt  
government arrested three leaders of the MIR (Movement of the Revolutionary Left), in whose weekly  
newspaper Izquierda on October 14 there had appeared a controversial
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editorial. Whereupon some 2,000 students of the Central University protested the government action as 
being unconstitutional. Violently suppressed by government forces, some of them then fled to the hills, and 
thus began the guerrilla movement that since February 20, 1963, has been known as the FALN (Armed 
Forces of National Liberation) and has since become predominantly agrarian in its membership."'
The editorial in question insisted that a popular insurrection could not succeed; and a week after its 
appearance a spokesman for MIR was still insisting on his organization's non-subversive intention to work 
toward  elections  scheduled  for  1963.  The  Betancourt  government,  however,  rationalized  its  violent 
behavior on the grounds that the editorial had advocated violent overthrow of the government, and it is the 
latter interpretation, quite without foundation, that has found its way into a United States military manual  
prepared  by  SORO  (Special  Operations  Research  Office)  and  entitled  Venezuela:  U.S.  Army  Area  
Handbook for Venezuela."'  Thus indoctrinated, some 200 American military advisers have since made it 
possible for the Venezuelan guerrillas to share with Peruvians and Vietnamese the dubious distinction of  
having experienced the heat if not the light of napalm."'
On occasion, of course, the outcasts of this earth learn to articulate not only their misery, as in the  
American  Negro  spiritual  or  "blues,"  but  also  their  anger.  This  is,  for  example,  the  extraordinary  
significance of the writings of Frantz Fanon, best known for a work entitled The Wretched o f the Earth."'  
A position such as that of  Fanon, however,  is utterly unintelligible to those who pride themselves on 
proclaiming the secular heaven which at least the fittest will survive to see. Thus Zbigniew Brzezinski, a  
Polish exile now devoted to the Pax Americana, can say: 1º'
. . . today the differences between the two worlds are so pronounced that it is difficult to conceive 
a  new ideological  wave  originating  from  the  developed  world,  where  the  tradition  of  utopian 
thinking is generally declining.
With  the  widening  gap  dooming any hope  of  imitation,  the  more  likely  development  is  an 
ideology of rejection of the developed world. Racial hatred could provide the necessary emotional 
force, exploited by xenophobic and romantic leaders. The writings of Frantz Fanon--violent and 
racist--are a good example. Such ideologies of
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rejection, combining racialism with nationalism, would further reduce the chance of meaningful 
regional  cooperation,  so essential  if  technology and science are  to be effectively applied.  They  
would certainly widen the existing psychological and emotional gaps. Indeed, one might ask at this  
point : who is the truer repository of that indefinable quality we call human? The technologically 
dominant and conditioned technetron, increasingly trained to adjust to leisure, or the more "natural" 
and backward agrarian, more and more dominated by racial passions and continuously exhorted to 
work harder, even as his goal of the good life becomes more elusive?
The incredible hubris manifested in this statement by yet another apologist for the ancient ideology of 
might-makes-right constitutes in itself a neo-primitive artifact of great anthropological significance. For, in 
its barely hominoid grunts of superiority are recorded for any surviving intelligent beings (if not from the  
planet earth then perchance from beyond) the evolutionary dialectics that, ex hypothesi, shall have brought 
an  end to  homo sapiens  at  that  very moment  in  geological  time when members  of  the  species  were 
beginning to discover in many ways and from many sources that people are more important than prestige, 
more important than power, and even more important than progress. But to end on an only slightly more  
optimistic  note,  some  future  ecologist  exploring  the  planet  earth  might  possibly  be  able  to  date  the 
establishment of a homeostatic system from the disappearance of man.
Notes and References
1. By speaking here of "societal" rather than "social" change I deviate from the usage of those for whom the  
theory of social change is a major branch of sociology; but at the same time I thereby acknowledge a strong sympathy 
for  Amitai  Etzioni's  arguments  in  favor  of  what  he  calls  macro-sociology.  Although  highly  dubious  about  the  
ontological status of what Etzioni calls the "emergent properties" of a macro-system, I nonetheless find the adjective 
"societal" methodologically useful as shorthand for the conceptualization of a society as made up not only of micro-
individuals or even roles but of micro-societies which act either collectively or representationally upon other micro-
societies and/or upon the macro-society and are themselves so acted upon. I shall use "social" to refer generically to 
any  society  or  societies  without  regard  to  internal  complexity,  "societal"  precisely  to  specify  such  internal 
complexity.
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Press, 1969), pp. 229-30.
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the United Nations in its efforts to build a better world [p. 54]; but such observations point only to a methodological  
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5. See, however, Taylor, [p. 22], fn. 40. Robert Redfield, whom Taylor quotes [pp. 30-31], seems to deny that any 
such thing is happening; but Taylor himself seems prepared to allow the contrary when he notes that a sociocultural  
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